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Abstract
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equi-
librium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous
problems. Some are well known in the game theory commu-
nity; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner’s
dilemma is neither normatively nor descriptively reasonable.
However, new problems arise when considering Nash equi-
librium from a computer science perspective: for example,
Nash equilibrium is not robust (it does not tolerate “faulty”
or “unexpected” behavior), it does not deal with coalitions, it
does not take computation cost into account, and it does not
deal with cases where players are not aware of all aspects of
the game. Solution concepts that try to address these short-
comings of Nash equilibrium are discussed.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of
equilibrium in game theory. Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium
is a strategy profile (a collection of strategies, one for each
player in the game) such that no player can do better by
deviating. The intuition behind Nash equilibrium is that it
represent a possible steady state of play. It is a fixed point
where each player holds correct beliefs about what other
players are doing, and plays a best response to those beliefs.
Part of what makes Nash equilibrium so attractive is that
in games where each player has only finitely many possible
deterministic strategies, and we allow mixed (i.e., random-
ized) strategies, there is guaranteed to be a Nash equilibrium
[Nash 1950] (this was, in fact, the key result of Nash’s the-
sis).
For quite a few games, thinking in terms of Nash equi-
librium gives insight into what people do (there is a reason
that game theory is taught in business schools!). However,
as is well known, Nash equilibrium suffers from numerous
problems. For example, the Nash equilibrium in games such
as repeated prisoner’s dilemma is to always defect (see Sec-
tion 3 for more discussion of repeated prisoner’s dilemma).
It is hard to make a case that rational players “should” play
the Nash equilibrium in this game when “irrational” players
who cooperate for a while do much better! Moreover, in a
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game that is only played once, why should a Nash equilib-
rium arise when there are multiple Nash equilibria? Players
have no way of knowing which one will be played. And even
in games where there is a unique Nash equilibrium (like re-
peated prisoner’s dilemma), how do players obtain correct
beliefs about what other players are doing if the game is
played only once? (See [Kreps 1990] for a discussion of
some of these problems.)
Not surprisingly, there has been a great deal of work
in the economics community on developing alternative
solution concepts. Various alternatives to and refine-
ments of Nash equilibrium have been introduced, in-
cluding, among many others, rationalizability, sequen-
tial equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium,
proper equilibrium, and iterated deletion of weakly dom-
inated strategies. (These notions are discussed in stan-
dard game theory text, such as [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991;
Osborne and Rubinstein 1994].) Despite some successes,
none of these alternative solution concepts address the fol-
lowing three problems with Nash equilibrium, all inspired
by computer science concerns.
• Although both computer science and distributed com-
puting are concerned with multiple agents interacting,
the focus in the game theory literature has been on the
strategic concerns of agents—rational players choosing
strategies that are best responses to strategies chosen
by other player, the focus in distributed computing
has been on problems such as fault tolerance and
asynchrony, leading to, for example work on Byzan-
tine agreement [Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson 1985;
Pease, Shostak, and Lamport 1980]. Nash equilibrium
does not deal with “faulty” or “unexpected” behavior, nor
does it deal with colluding agents. In large games, we
should expect both.
• Nash equilibrium does not take computational concerns
into account. We need solution concepts that can deal
with resource-bounded players, concerns that are at the
heart of cryptography.
• Nash equilibrium presumes that players have common
knowledge of the structure of the game, including all the
possible moves that can be made in every situation and all
the players in game. This is not always reasonable in, for
example, the large auctions played over the internet.
In the following sections, I discuss each of these issues in
more detail, and sketch solution concepts that can deal with
them, with pointers to the relevant literature.
2 Robust and Resilient Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium tolerates deviations by one player. It is
perfectly consistent with Nash equilibrium that two players
could do much better by deviating in a coordinated way. For
example, consider a game with n > 1 players where players
much play either 0 or 1. If everyone plays 0, everyone get a
payoff of 1; if exactly two players plays 1 and the rest play
0, then the two who play 1 get a payoff of 2, and the rest get
0; otherwise, everyone gets 0. Clearly everyone playing 0 is
a Nash equilibrium, but any pair of players can do better by
deviating and playing 1.
Say that a Nash equilibrium is k-resilient if it tolerates
deviations by coalitions of up to k players. The notion of
resilience is an old one in the game theory literature, going
back to Aumann [1959]. Various extensions of Nash equi-
librium have been proposed in the game theory literature to
deal with coalitions [Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 1989;
Moreno and Wooders 1996]. However, these notions do not
deal with players who act in unexpected ways.
There can be many reasons that players act in unexpected
ways. One, of course, is that they are indeed irrational.
However, often seemingly irrational behavior can be ex-
plained by players having unexpected utilities. For example,
in a peer-to-peer network like Kazaa or Gnutella, it would
seem that no rational agent should share files. Whether or
not you can get a file depends only on whether other people
share files. Moreover, there are disincentives for sharing (the
possibility of lawsuits, use of bandwidth, etc.). Neverthe-
less, people do share files. However, studies of the Gnutella
network have shown that almost 70 percent of users share no
files and nearly 50 percent of responses are from the top 1
percent of sharing hosts [Adar and Huberman 2000]. Is the
behavior of the sharing hosts irrational? It is if we assume
appropriate utilities. But perhaps sharing hosts get a big kick
out of being the ones that provide everyone else with the mu-
sic they play. Is that so irrational? In other cases, seemingly
irrational behavior can be explained by faulty computers or
a faulty network (this, of course, is the concern that work
on Byzantine agreement is trying to address), or a lack of
understanding of the game.
To give just one example of a stylized game where this
issue might be relevant, consider a group of n bargaining
agents. If they all stay and bargain, then all get 2. However,
if any agent leaves the bargaining table, those who leave get
1, while those who stay get 0. Clearly everyone staying at
the bargaining table is a k-resilient Nash equilibrium for all
k ≥ 0, and it is Pareto optimal (everyone in fact gets the
highest possible payoff). But, especially if n is large, this
equilibrium is rather “fragile”; all it takes is one person to
leave the bargaining table for those who stay to get 0.
Whatever the reason, as pointed out by Abraham et
al. [2006], it seems important to design strategies that tol-
erate such unanticipated behaviors, so that the payoffs of
the users with “standard” utilities do not get affected by
the nonstandard players using different strategies. This can
be viewed as a way of adding fault tolerance to equilib-
rium notions. To capture this intuition, Abraham et al.
[Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern 2006] define a strat-
egy profile to be t-immune if no player who does not deviate
is worse off if up to t players do deviate. Note the differ-
ence between resilience and immunity. A strategy profile is
resilient if deviators do not gain by deviating; a profile is
immune if non-deviators do not get hurt by deviators. In the
example above, although everyone bargaining is a k-resilient
Nash equilibrium for all k ≥ 0, it is not 1-immune.
Of course, we may want to combine resilience and re-
silience; a strategy is (k, t)-robust if it is both k-resilient and
t-immune. (All the informal definitions here are completely
formalized in [Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern 2006;
Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern 2008].) A Nash equilibrium
is just a (1,0)-robust equilibrium. Unfortunately, for (k, t) 6=
(1, 0), a (k, t)-robust equilibrium does not exist in gen-
eral. Nevertheless, there are a number of games of inter-
est where they do exist; in particular, they can exist if play-
ers can take advantage of a mediator, or trusted third party.
To take just one example, consider Byzantine agreement
[Pease, Shostak, and Lamport 1980]. Recall that in Byzan-
tine agreement there are n soldiers, up to t of which may be
faulty (the t stands for traitor), one of which is the general.
The general has an initial preference to attack or retreat. We
want a protocol that guarantees that (1) all nonfaulty soldiers
reach the same decision, and (2) if the general is nonfaulty,
then the decision is the general’s preference. It is trivial
to solve Byzantine agreement with a mediator: the general
simply sends the mediator his preference, and the mediator
sends it to all the soldiers.
The obvious question of interest is whether we can
implement the mediator. That is, can the players in
the system, just talking among themselves (using what
economists call “cheap talk”) simulate the effects of the
mediator. This is a question that has been of interest to
both the computer science community and the game the-
ory community. In game theory, the focus has been on
whether a Nash equilibrium in a game with a mediator
can be implemented using cheap talk (cf. [Barany 1992;
Ben-Porath 2003; Forges 1990; Gerardi 2004; Heller 2005;
Urbano and Vila 2002; Urbano and Vila 2004]). In cryptog-
raphy, the focus has been on secure multiparty computation
[Goldreich et al. 1987; Shamir et al. 1981; Yao 1982]. Here
it is assumed that each agent i has some private information
xi (such private information, like the general’s preference,
is typically called the player’s type in game theory). Fix a
function f . The goal is have agent i learn f(x1, . . . , xn)
without learning anything about xj for j 6= i beyond what
is revealed by the value of f(x1, . . . , xn). With a trusted
mediator, this is trivial: each agent i just gives the mediator
its private value xi; the mediator then sends each agent i the
value f(x1, . . . , xn). Work on multiparty computation pro-
vides general conditions under which this can be done (see
[Goldreich 2004] for an overview). Somewhat surprisingly,
despite there being over 20 years of work on this problem
in both computer science and game theory, until recently,
there has been no interaction between the communities on
this topic.
Abraham et al. [2006, 2008] essentially characterize when
mediators can be implemented. To understand the results,
three games need to be considered: an underlying game Γ,
an extensionΓd ofΓwith a mediator, and a cheap-talk exten-
sion ΓCT of Γ. Γ is assumed to be a normal-form Bayesian
game: each player has a type from some type space with a
known distribution over types, and must choose an action
(where the choice can depend on his type). The utilities of
the players depend on the types and actions taken. For exam-
ple, in Byzantine agreement, the possible types of the gen-
eral are 0 and 1, his possible initial preferences (the types of
the other players are irrelevant). The players’ actions are to
attack or retreat. The assumption that there is a distribution
over the general’s preferences is standard in game theory, al-
though not so much in distributed computing. Nonetheless,
in many applications of Byzantine agreement, it seems rea-
sonable to assume such a distribution. Roughly speaking,
a cheap talk game implements a game with a mediator if it
induces the same distribution over actions in the underlying
game, for each type vector of the players. With this back-
ground, I can summarize the results of Abraham et al.
• If n > 3k + 3t, a (k, t)-robust strategy ~σ with a medi-
ator can be implemented using cheap talk (that is, there
is a (k, t)-robust strategy ~σ′ in the cheap talk game such
that ~σ and ~σ′ induce the same distribution over actions
in the underlying game). Moreover, the implementation
requires no knowledge of other agents’ utilities, and the
cheap talk protocol has bounded running time that does
not depend on the utilities.
• If n ≤ 3k + 3t then, in general, mediators cannot be im-
plemented using cheap talk without knowledge of other
agents’ utilities. Moreover, even if other agents’ utilities
are known, mediators cannot, in general, be implemented
without having a (k + t)-punishment strategy (that is, a
strategy that, if used by all but at most k+ t players, guar-
antees that every player gets a worse outcome than they do
with the equilibrium strategy) nor with bounded running
time.
• If n > 2k+3t, then mediators can be implemented using
cheap talk if there is a punishment strategy (and utilities
are known) in finite expected running time that does not
depend on the utilities.
• If n ≤ 2k + 3t then mediators cannot, in general, be im-
plemented, even if there is a punishment strategy and util-
ities are known.
• If n > 2k + 2t and there are broadcast channels then, for
all ǫ, mediators can be ǫ-implemented (intuitively, there
is an implementation where players get utility within ǫ of
what they could get by deviating) using cheap talk, with
bounded expected running time that does not depend on
the utilities.
• If n ≤ 2k + 2t then mediators cannot, in general, be ǫ-
implemented, even with broadcast channels. Moreover,
even assuming cryptography and polynomially-bounded
players, the expected running time of an implementation
depends on the utility functions of the players and ǫ.
• If n > k + 3t then, assuming cryptography and
polynomially-bounded players, mediators can be ǫ-
implemented using cheap talk, but if n ≤ 2k + 2t, then
the running time depends on the utilities in the game and
ǫ.
• If n ≤ k + 3t, then even assuming cryptography,
polynomially-bounded players, and a (k+ t)-punishment
strategy, mediators cannot, in general, be ǫ-implemented
using cheap talk.
• If n > k + t then, assuming cryptography, polynomially-
bounded players, and a public-key infrastructure (PKI),
we can ǫ-implement a mediator.
All the possibility results showing that mediators can
be implemented use techniques from secure multiparty
computation. The results showing that that if n ≤ 3k + 3t,
then we cannot implement a mediator without knowing
utilities and that, even if utilities are known, a punish-
ment strategy is required, use the fact that Byzantine
agreement cannot be reached if t < n/3; the impos-
sibility result for n ≤ 2k + 3t also uses a variant of
Byzantine agreement. These results provide an excellent
illustration of how the interaction between computer
science and game theory can lead to fruitful insights.
Related work on implementing mediators can be found
in [Gordon and Katz 2006; Halpern and Teague 2004;
Izmalkov, Micali, and Lepinski 2005; Kol and Naor 2008;
Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and Shelat 2004;
Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos 2006].
3 Taking Computation Into Account
Nash equilibrium does not take computation into account.
To see why this might be a problem, consider the following
example, taken from [Halpern and Pass 2008].
Example 3.1: You are given a number n-bit number x. You
can guess whether it is prime, or play safe and say nothing.
If you guess right, you get $10; if you guess wrong, you lose
$10; if you play safe, you get $1. There is only one Nash
equilibrium in this 1-player game: giving the right answer.
But if n is large, this is almost certainly not what people will
do. Even though primality testing can be done in polynomial
time, the costs for doing so (buying a larger computer, for
example, or writing an appropriate program), will probably
not be worth it for most people. The point here is that Nash
equilibrium is not taking the cost of computing whether x is
prime into account.
There have been attempts in the game theory community
to define solution concepts that take computation into ac-
count, going back to the work of Rubinstein [1986]. (See
[Kalai 1990] for an overview of the work in this area in the
1980s, and [Ben-Sasson, Kalai, and Kalai 2007] for more
recent work.) Rubinstein assumed that players choose a fi-
nite automaton to play the game rather than choosing a strat-
egy directly; a player’s utility depends both on the move
made by the automaton and the complexity of the automaton
(identified with the number of states of the automaton). In-
tuitively, automata that use more states are seen as represent-
ing more complicated procedures. Rafael Pass and I [2008]
provide a general game-theoretic framework that takes com-
putation into account. (All the discussion in this section is
taken from [Halpern and Pass 2008].) Like Rubinstein, we
view all players as choosing a machine, but we use Turing
machines, rather than finite automata. We associate a com-
plexity, not just with a machine, but with the machine and its
input. This is important in Example 3.1, where the complex-
ity of computing whether x is prime depends, in general, on
the length of x.
The complexity could represent the running time of or
space used by the machine on that input. The complexity
can also be used to capture the complexity of the machine
itself (e.g., the number of states, as in Rubinstein’s case) or
to model the cost of searching for a new strategy to replace
one that the player already has. (One of the reasons that
players follow a recommended strategy is that there may be
too much effort involved in trying to find a new one; I return
to this point later.)
We again consider Bayesian games, where each player
has a type. In a standard Bayesian game, an agent’s util-
ity depends on the type profile and the action profile (that is,
every player’s type, and the action chosen by each player).
In a computational Bayesian game, each player i chooses
a Turing machine. Player i’s type ti is taken to be the in-
put to player i’s Turing machine Mi. The output of Mi on
input ti is taken to be player i’s action. There is also a com-
plexity associated with the pair (Mi, ti). Player i’s utility
again depends on the type profile and the action profile, and
also on the complexity profile. The reason we consider the
whole complexity profile in determining player i’s utility, as
opposed to just i’s complexity, is that, for example, i might
be happy as long as his machine takes fewer steps than j’s.
Given these definitions, we can define Nash equilibrium as
usual. With this definition, by defining the complexity ap-
propriately, it will be the case that playing safe for suffi-
ciently large inputs will be an equilibrium.
Computational Nash equilibrium also gives a plausible
explanation of observed behavior in finitely-repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma.
Example 3.2: Recall that prisoner’s dilemma, in prisoner’s
dilemma, there are two prisoners, who can choose to either
cooperate or defect. As described in the table below, if they
both cooperate, they both get 3; if they both defect, then both
get 1; if one defects and the other cooperates, the defector
gets 5 and the cooperator gets −5. (Intuitively, the cooper-
ator stays silent, while the defector “rats out” his partner. If
they both rat each other out, they both go to jail.)
C D
C (3,3) (−5, 5)
D (5,−5) (-3,-3)
It is easy to see that defecting dominates cooperating: no
matter what the other player does, a player is better off de-
fecting than cooperating. Thus, “rational” players should
defect. And, indeed, (D,D) is the only Nash equilibrium
of this game. Although (C,C) gives both players a better
payoff than (D,D), this is not an equilibrium.
Now consider finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
(FRPD), where prisoner’s dilemma is played for some fixed
number N of rounds. The only Nash equilibrium is to al-
ways defect; this can be seen by a backwards induction ar-
gument. (The last round is like the one-shot game, so both
players should defect; given that they are both defecting at
the last round, they should both defect at the second-last
round; and so on.) This seems quite unreasonable. And,
indeed, in experiments, people do not always defect. In fact,
quite often they cooperate throughout the game. Are they ir-
rational? It is hard to call this irrational behavior, given that
the “irrational” players do much better than supposedly ra-
tional players who always defect. There have been many at-
tempts to explain cooperation in FRPD in the literature (see,
for example, [Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 1982]).
Indeed, there have even been well-known attempts that take
computation into account; it can be shown that if players
are restricted to using a finite automaton with bounded com-
plexity, then there exist equilibria that allow for cooper-
ation [Neyman 1985; Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994].
However, the strategies used in those equilibria are quite
complex, and require the use of large automata; as a conse-
quence this approach does not seem to provide a satisfactory
explanation as to why people choose to cooperate.
Using the framework described above leads to a straight-
forward explanation. Consider the tit-for-tat strategy, which
proceeds as follows: a player cooperates at the first round,
and then at round m+ 1, does whatever his opponent did at
round m. Thus, if the opponent cooperated at the previous
round, then you reward him by continuing to cooperate; if he
defected at the previous round, you punish him by defecting.
If both players play tit-for-tat, then they cooperate through-
out the game. Interestingly, tit-for-tat does exceedingly well
in FRPD tournaments, where computer programs play each
other [Axelrod 1984].
Tit-for-tat is a simple program, which needs very little
memory. Suppose that we charge even a modest amount
for memory usage, and that there is a discount factor δ, with
.5 < δ < 1, so that if the player gets a reward of rm in round
m, his total reward over the whole N -round game is taken
to be
∑N
m=1 δ
mrm. In this case, it is easy to see that, no
matter what the cost of memory is, as long as it is positive,
for a sufficiently long game, it will be a Nash equilibrium
for both players to play tit-for-tat. For the best response to
tit-for-tat is to play tit-for-tat up to the last round, and then
to defect. But following this strategy requires the player to
keep track of the round number, which requires the use of
extra memory. The extra gain of $2 achieved by defecting at
the last round, if sufficiently discounted, will not be worth
the cost of keeping track of the round number.
Note that even if only one player is computationally
bounded and is charged for memory, and memory is free for
the other player, then there is a Nash equilibrium where the
bounded player plays tit-for-tat, while the other player plays
the best response of cooperating up (but not including) to the
round of the game, and then defecting.
Although with standard games there is always a Nash
equilibrium, this is not the case when we take computation
into account, as the following example shows.
Example 3.3: Consider roshambo (rock-paper-scissors). We
model playing rock, paper, and scissors as playing 0, 1, and
2, respectively. The payoff to player 1 of the outcome (i, j)
is 1 if i = j ⊕ 1 (where ⊕ denotes addition mod 3), −1 if
j = i⊕1, and 0 if i = j. Player 2’s playoffs are the negative
of those of player 1; the game is a zero-sum game. As is
well known, the unique Nash equilibrium of this game has
the players randomizing uniformly between 0, 1, and 2.
Now consider a computational version of roshambo. Sup-
pose that we take the complexity of a deterministic strategy
to be 1, and the complexity of a strategy that uses random-
ization to be 2, and take player i’s utility to be his payoff in
the underlying Bayesian game minus the complexity of his
strategy. Intuitively, programs involving randomization are
more complicated than those that do not randomize. With
this utility function, it is easy to see that there is no Nash
equilibrium. For suppose that (M1,M2) is an equilibrium.
If M1 uses randomization, then 1 can do better by playing
the deterministic strategy j ⊕ 1, where j is the action that
gets the highest probability according to M2 (or is the de-
terministic choice of player 2 if M2 does not use random-
ization). Similarly, M2 cannot use randomization. But it is
well known (and easy to check) that there is no equilibrium
for roshambo with deterministic strategies.
Is the lack of Nash equilibrium a problem? Perhaps not.
Taking computation into account should cause us to rethink
things. In particular, we may want to consider other solution
concepts. But, as the examples above show, Nash equilib-
rium does seem to make reasonable predictions in a num-
ber of games of interest. Perhaps of even more interest, us-
ing computational Nash equilibrium lets us provide a game-
theoretic account of security.
The standard framework for multiparty security does not
take into account whether players have an incentive to ex-
ecute the protocol. That is, if there were a trusted media-
tor, would player i actually use the recommended protocol
even if i would be happy to use the services of the media-
tor to compute the function f? Nor does it take into account
whether the adversary has an incentive to undermine the pro-
tocol.
Roughly speaking, the game-theoretic definition says
that Π is a game-theoretically secure (cheap-talk) proto-
col for computing f if, for all choices of the utility func-
tion, if it is a Nash equilibrium to play with the me-
diator to compute f , then it is also a Nash equilibrium
to use Π to compute f . Note that this definition does
not mention privacy. It does not need to; this is taken
care of by choosing the utilities appropriately. Pass and
I [2008] show that, under minimal assumptions, this defi-
nition is essentially equivalent to a variant of zero knowl-
edge [Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff 1989] called precise
zero knowledge [Micali and Pass 2006]. Thus, the two ap-
proaches used for dealing with “deviating” players in two
game theory and cryptography—Nash equilibrium and zero-
knowledge “simulation”—are intimately connected; indeed,
they are essentially equivalent once we take computation
into account appropriately.
4 Taking (Lack of) Awareness Into Account
Standard game theory models implicitly assume that all sig-
nificant aspects of the game (payoffs, moves available, etc.)
are common knowledge among the players. However, this
is not always a reasonable assumption. For example, sleazy
companies assume that consumers are not aware that they
can lodge complaints if there are problems; in a war setting,
having technology that an enemy is unaware of (and thus be-
ing able to make moves that the enemy is unaware of) can
be critical; in financial markets, some investors may not be
aware of certain investment strategies (complicated hedging
strategies, for example, or tax-avoidance strategies).
To understand the impact of adding the possibility of
unawareness to the analysis of games, consider the game
shown in Figure 1 (this example, and all the discussion in
this section, is taken from [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006]). One
Nash equilibrium of this game has A playing acrossA and
B playing downB. However, suppose that A is not aware
that B can play downB. In that case, if A is rational, A will
play downA. Therefore, Nash equilibrium does not seem to
be the appropriate solution concept here. AlthoughA would
play acrossA if A knew that B were going to play downB, A
cannot even contemplate this possibility, let alone know it.
Figure 1: A simple game.
To find an appropriate analogue of Nash equilibrium in
games where players may be unaware of some possible
moves, we must first find an appropriate representation for
such games. The first step in doing so is to explicitly repre-
sent what players are aware of at each node. We do this by
using what we call an augmented game.
Recall that an extensive game is described by a game
tree. Each node in the tree describes a partial history of the
game—the sequence of moves that led to that node. Asso-
ciated with each node is the player that moves at that node.
Some nodes where a player i moves are grouped together
into an information set for player i. Intuitively, if player
i is at some node in an information set I , then i does not
know which node of I describes the true situation; thus, at
all nodes in I , i must make the same move. An augmented
game is an extensive game with one more feature: associ-
ated with each node in the game tree where player i moves
is the level of awareness of player i—the set of histories that
player i is aware of.
We use the player’s awareness level as a way of keep-
ing track of how the player’s awareness changes over time.
For example, perhapsA playing acrossA will result in B be-
coming aware of the possibility of playing downB. In finan-
cial settings, one effect of players using certain investment
strategies is that other players become aware of the possibil-
ity of using that strategy. Strategic thinking in such games
must take this possibility into account. We would model
this possibility by having some probability of B’s awareness
level changing. (The formal definition of augmented game
can be found in [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006].)
For example, suppose that in the game shown in Figure 1
• players A and B are aware of all histories of the game;
• player A is uncertain as to whether player B is aware of
run 〈acrossA, downB〉 and believes that he is unaware of
it with probability p; and
• the type of player B that is aware of the run 〈acrossA,
downB〉 is aware that player A is aware of all histories,
and he knows A is uncertain about his awareness level
and knows the probability p.
Because A and B are actually aware of all histories of
the underlying game, from the point of view of the modeler,
the augmented game is essentially identical to the game de-
scribed in Figure 1, with the awareness level of both players
A and B consisting of all histories of the underlying game.
However, when A moves at the node labeled A in the mod-
eler’s game, she believes that the actual augmented game is
ΓA, as described in Figure 2. In ΓA, nature’s initial move
captures A’s uncertainty about B’s awareness level. At the
information set labeled A.1, A is aware of all the runs of
the underlying game. Moreover, at this information set, A
believes that the true game is ΓA.
At the node labeled B.1, B is aware of all the runs of
the underlying game and believes that the true game is the
modeler’s game; but at the node labeled B.2, B is not aware
that he can play downB, and so believes that the true game
is the augmented game ΓB described in Figure 3. At the
nodes labeled A.3 and B.3 in the game ΓB , neither A nor B
is aware of the move downB. Moreover, both players think
the true game is ΓB .
Figure 2: The augmented game ΓA.
As this example should make clear, to model a game with
possibly unaware players, we need to consider, not just one
Figure 3: The augmented game ΓB .
augmented game, but a collection of them. Moreover, we
need to describe, at each history in an augmented game,
which augmented game the player playing at that history be-
lieves is the actual augmented game being played.
To capture these intuitions, starting with an underlying
extensive-form game Γ, we define a game with awareness
based on Γ to be a tuple Γ∗ = (G,Γm,F), where
• G is a countable set of augmented games based on Γ, of
which one is Γm;
• F maps an augmented game Γ+ ∈ G and a history h in
Γ+ such that P+(h) = i to a pair (Γh, I), where Γh ∈ G
and I is an information set for player i in game Γh.
Intuitively, Γm is the game from the point of view of an om-
niscient modeler. If player i moves at h in game Γ+ ∈ G
and F(Γ+, h) = (Γh, I), then Γh is the game that i believes
to be the true game when the history is h, and I consists
of the set of histories in Γh he currently considers possi-
ble. For example, in the examples described in Figures 2
and 3, taking Γm to the augmented game in Figure 1, we
have F(Γm, 〈 〉) = (ΓA, I), where I is the information set
labeled A.1 in Figure 2, and F(ΓA, 〈unaware,acrossA〉) =
(ΓB, {〈acrossA〉}). There are a number of consistency con-
ditions that have to be satisfied by the functionF ; the details
can be found in [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006].
The standard notion of Nash equilibrium consists of a pro-
file of strategies, one for each player. Our generalization
consists of a profile of strategies, one for each pair (i,Γ′),
where Γ′ is a game that agent i considers to be the true game
in some situation. Intuitively, the strategy for a player i at Γ′
is the strategy iwould play in situations where i believes that
the true game is Γ′. To understand why we may need to con-
sider different strategies consider, for example, the game of
Figure 1. B would play differently depending on whether or
not he was aware of downB. Roughly speaking, a profile ~σ
of strategies, one for each pair (i,Γ′), is a generalized Nash
equilibrium if σi,Γ′ is a best response for player i if the true
game is Γ′, given the strategies σj,Γ′ being used by the other
players in Γ′. As shown in [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006], every
game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium.
A standard extensive-form game Γ can be viewed as a
special case of a game with awareness, by taking Γm = Γ,
G = {Γm}, and F(Γm, h) = (Γm, I), where I is the infor-
mation set that contains h. Intuitively, Γ corresponds to the
game of awareness where it is common knowledge that Γ is
being played. We call this the canonical representation of
Γ as a game with awareness. It is not hard to show that a
strategy profile ~σ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ iff it is a gen-
eralized Nash equilibrium of the canonical representation of
Γ as a game with awareness. Thus, generalized Nash equi-
librium can be viewed as a generalization of standard Nash
equilibrium.
Up to now, I have considered only games where players
are not aware of their lack of awareness. But in some games,
a player might be aware that there are moves that another
player (or even she herself) might be able to make, although
she is not aware of what they are. Such awareness of un-
awareness can be quite relevant in practice. For example, in
a war setting, even if one side cannot conceive of a new tech-
nology available to the enemy, they might believe that there
is some move available to the enemy without understanding
what that particular move is. This, in turn, may encourage
peace overtures. To take another example, an agent might
delay making a decision because she considers it possible
that she might learn about more possible moves, even if she
is not aware of what these moves are.
Although, economists usually interpret awareness as “be-
ing able to conceive about an event or a proposition”, there
are other possible meanings for this concept. For exam-
ple, awareness may also be interpreted as “understanding
the primitive concepts in an event or proposition”, or as
“being able to determine if an event occurred or not”, or
as “being able to compute the consequences of some fact”
[Fagin and Halpern 1988]. If we interpret “lack of aware-
ness” as “unable to compute” (note that this interpretation
is closely related to the discussion of the previous section!),
then awareness of unawareness becomes even more signif-
icant. Consider a chess game. Although all players under-
stand in principle all the moves that can be made, they are
certainly not aware of all consequences of all moves. A more
accurate representation of chess would model this computa-
tional unawareness explicitly. We provide such a represen-
tation.
Roughly speaking, we capture the fact that player i is
aware that, at a node h in the game tree, there is a move
that j can make she (i) is not aware by having i’s subjective
representation of the game include a “virtual” move for j at
node h. Since i might have only an incomplete understand-
ing of what can happen after this move, i simply describes
what she believes will be the game after the virtual move, to
the extent that she can. In particular, if she has no idea what
will happen after the virtual move, then she can describe her
beliefs regarding the payoffs of the game. Thus, our rep-
resentation can be viewed as a generalization of how chess
programs analyze chess games. They explore the game tree
up to a certain point, and then evaluate the board position at
that point. We can think of the payoffs following a virtual
move by j in i’s subjective representation of a chess game
as describing the evaluation of the board from i’s point of
view. This seems like a much more reasonable representa-
tion of the game than the standard complete game tree!
All the definitions of games with awareness can be gener-
alized to accommodate awareness of unawareness. In partic-
ular, we can define a generalized Nash equilibrium as before,
and once again show that every game with awareness (in-
cluding awareness of unawareness) has a generalized Nash
equilibrium [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006].
There has been a great deal of work recently on
modeling unawareness in games. The first papers on
the topic was by Feinberg [2004, 2005]. My work
with Reˆgo [2006] was the first to consider awareness
in extensive games, modeling how awareness changed
over time. There has been a recent flurry on the
topic in the economics literature; see, for example,
[Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006b; Li 2006a; Li 2006b;
Ozbay 2007]. Closely related is work on logics that include
awareness. This work started in the computer science
literature [Fagin and Halpern 1988], but more recently, the
bulk of the work has appeared in the economics literature
(see, for example, [Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 1998;
Halpern 2001; Halpern and Reˆgo 2008;
Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006a;
Modica and Rustichini 1994;
Modica and Rustichini 1999]).
5 Conclusions
I have considered three ways of going beyond standard Nash
equilibrium, which take fault tolerance, computation, and
lack of awareness into account, respectively. These are
clearly only first steps. Here are some directions for fur-
ther research (some of which I am currently engaged in with
my collaborators):
• For example, while (k, t)-robust equilibrium does seem to
be a reasonable way of capturing some aspects of robust-
ness, for some applications, it does not go far enough. I
said earlier that in economics, all players were assumed
to be strategic, or “rational”; in distributed computing,
all players were either “good” (and followed the recom-
mended protocol) or “bad” (in which case they could be
arbitrarily malicious). Immunity takes into account the
bad players. The definition of immunity requires that the
rational players are not hurt no matter what the “bad”
players do. But this may be too strong. As Ayer et
al. [2005] point out, it is reasonable to expect a certain
fraction of players in a system to be “good” and follow
the recommended protocol, even if it is not a best reply.
In general, it may be hard to figure out what the best reply
is, so if following the recommended protocol is not unrea-
sonable, they will do that. (Note that this can be captured
in a computational model of equilibrium, by charging for
switching from the recommended strategy.)
There may be other standard ways that players act irra-
tional. For example, Kash, Friedman, and I [2007] con-
sider scrip systems, where players perform work in ex-
change for scrip. There is a Nash equilibrium where ev-
eryone uses a threshold strategy, performing work only
when they have less scrip than some threshold amount.
Two standard ways of acting “irrationally” in such a sys-
tem are to (a) hoard scrip and (b) provide service for free
(this is the analogue of posting music on Kazaa). A ro-
bust solution should take into account these more standard
types of irrational behavior, without perhaps worrying as
much about arbitrary irrational behavior.
• The definitions of computational Nash equilibrium con-
sidered only Bayesian games. What would appropriate
solution concepts be for extensive-form games? Some
ideas from the work on awareness seem relevant here, es-
pecially if we think of “lack of awareness” as “unable to
compute”.
• Where do the beliefs come from in an equilibrium with
awareness? That is, if I suddenly become aware that you
can make a certain move, what probability should I assign
to you making that move? Ozbay [2007] proposes a so-
lution concept where the beliefs are part of the solution
concept. He considers only a simple setting, where one
player is aware of everything (so that revealing informa-
tion is purely strategic). Can his ideas be extended to a
more general setting?
Agents playing a game can be viewed participat-
ing in a concurrent, distributed protocol. Game the-
ory does not take the asynchrony into account, but
it can make a big difference. For example, all the
results from [Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern 2006;
Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern 2008] mentioned in Section 2
depend on the system being synchronous. Things are more
complicted in asynchronous settings. Getting solution con-
cepts and that deal well with with asynchrony is clearly im-
portant.
Another issue that plays a major role in computer science
but has thus far not been viewed as significant in game the-
ory, but will, I believe, turn out to be important to the prob-
lem of defining appropriate solution concepts, is the ana-
logue of specifying and verifying programs. Games are typ-
ically designed to solve certain problems. Thus, for exam-
ple, economists want to design a spectrum auction so that
the equilibrium has certain features. As I pointed out in an
earlier overview [Halpern 2003], game theory has typically
focused on “small” games: games that are easy to describe,
such as Prisoner’s Dilemma. The focus has been on sub-
tleties regarding basic issues such as rationality and coor-
dination. To the extent that game theory is used to tackle
larger, more practical problems, and especially to the ex-
tent that it is computers, or software agents, playing games,
rather than people, it will be important to specify carefully
exactly what a solution to the game must accomplish. For
example, in the context of a spectrum auction, a specifica-
tion will have to address what should happen if a computer
crashes while an agent is in the middle of transmitting a bid,
how to deal with agents bidding on slow lines, dealing with
agents who win but then go bankrupt, and so on.
Finding logics to reason about solutions, especially do-
ing so in a way that takes into account robustness and asyn-
chrony, seems to me a difficult and worthwhile challenge.
Indeed, one desideratum for a good solution concept is that
it should be easy to reason about. Pursuing this theme, com-
puter scientists have learned that one good way of designing
correct programs is to do so in a modular way. Can a similar
idea be applied in game theory? That is, can games designed
for solving smaller problems be combined in a seamless way
to solve a larger problem. If so, results about composability
of solutions will be needed; we might want a solution con-
cept that allows for such composability.
References
Abraham, I., D. Dolev, R. Gonen, and J. Halpern (2006).
Distributed computing meets game theory: Robust
mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty
computation. In Proc. 25th ACM Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Distributed Computing, pp. 53–62.
Abraham, I., D. Dolev, and J. Halpern (2008). Lower
bounds on implementing robust and resilient media-
tors. In Fifth Theory of Cryptography Conference, pp.
302–319.
Adar, E. and B. Huberman (2000). Free riding on
Gnutella. First Monday 5(10).
Aumann, R. J. (1959). Acceptable points in general co-
operative n-person games. In A. Tucker and R. Luce
(Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games IV,
Annals of Mathematical Studies 40, pp. 287–324.
Princeton University Press.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic
Books.
Ayer, A., L. Alvisi, A. Clement, M. Dahlin, J. Martin, and
C. Porth (2005). BAR fault tolerance for cooperative
services. In Proc. 20th ACM Symposium on Operat-
ing Systems Principles (SOSP 2005), pp. 45–58.
Barany, I. (1992). Fair distribution protocols or how the
players replace fortune. Mathematics of Operations
Research 17, 327–340.
Ben-Porath, E. (2003). Cheap talk in games with in-
complete information. Journal of Economic The-
ory 108(1), 45–71.
Ben-Sasson, E., A. Kalai, and E. Kalai (2007). An ap-
proach to bounded rationality. In Advances in Neu-
ral Information Processing Systems 19 (Proc. of NIPS
2006), pp. 145–152.
Bernheim, B. D., B. Peleg, and M. Whinston (1989).
Coalition proof Nash equilibrium: concepts. Journal
of Economic Theory 42(1), 1–12.
Dekel, E., B. Lipman, and A. Rustichini (1998). Standard
state-space models preclude unawareness. Economet-
rica 66, 159–173.
Fagin, R. and J. Y. Halpern (1988). Belief, awareness, and
limited reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 34, 39–76.
Feinberg, Y. (2004). Subjective reasoning—games with
unawareness. Technical Report Resarch Paper Series
#1875, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Feinberg, Y. (2005). Games with incomplete awareness.
Technical Report Resarch Paper Series #1894, Stan-
ford Graduate School of Business.
Fischer, M. J., N. A. Lynch, and M. S. Paterson (1985).
Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty
processor. Journal of the ACM 32(2), 374–382.
Forges, F. (1990). Universal mechanisms. Economet-
rica 58(6), 1341–64.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991). Game Theory. MIT
Press.
Gerardi, D. (2004). Unmediated communication in
games with complete and incomplete information.
Journal of Economic Theory 114, 104–131.
Goldreich, O. (2004). Foundations of Cryptography, Vol.
2. Cambridge University Press.
Goldreich, O., S. Micali, and A. Wigderson (1987). How
to play any mental game. In Proc. 19th ACM Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing, pp. 218–229.
Goldwasser, S., S. Micali, and C. Rackoff (1989). The
knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems.
SIAM Journal on Computing 18(1), 186–208.
Gordon, D. and J. Katz (2006). Rational secret sharing,
revisited. In SCN (Security in Communication Net-
works) 2006, pp. 229–241.
Halpern, J. Y. (2001). Alternative semantics for unaware-
ness. Games and Economic Behavior 37, 321–339.
Halpern, J. Y. (2003). A computer scientist looks at game
theory. Games and Economic Behavior 45(1), 114–
132.
Halpern, J. Y. and R. Pass (2008). Game theory with
costly computation. Unpublished manuscript.
Halpern, J. Y. and L. C. Reˆgo (2006). Extensive games
with possibly unaware players. In Proc. Fifth Inter-
national Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, pp. 744–751. Full version avail-
able at arxiv.org/abs/0704.2014.
Halpern, J. Y. and L. C. Reˆgo (2008). Interactive un-
awareness revisited. Games and Economic Behav-
ior 62(1), 232–262.
Halpern, J. Y. and V. Teague (2004). Rational secret shar-
ing and multiparty computation: extended abstract. In
Proc. 36th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pp. 623–632.
Heifetz, A., M. Meier, and B. Schipper (2006a). Interac-
tive unawareness. Journal of Economic Theory 130,
78–94.
Heifetz, A., M. Meier, and B. Schipper
(2006b). Unawareness, beliefs and games.
Unpublished manuscript, available at
www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unawprob.pdf.
Heller, Y. (2005). A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol.
Unpublished manuscript.
Izmalkov, S., S. Micali, and M. Lepinski (2005). Rational
secure computation and ideal mechanism design. In
Proc. 46th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, pp. 585–595.
Kalai, E. (1990). Bounded rationality and strategic com-
plexity in repeated games. In Game Theory and Ap-
plications, pp. 131–157. Academic Press.
Kash, I., E. J. Friedman, and J. Y. Halpern (2007). Opti-
mizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders,
and altruists. In Proc. Eighth ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, pp. 305–315.
Kol, G. and M. Naor (2008). Cryptography and game the-
ory: Designing protocols for exchanging information.
In Theory of Cryptography Conference, pp. 320–339.
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982).
Rational cooperation in finitely repeated prisoners’
dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 245–
252.
Kreps, D. M. (1990). Game Theory and Economic Mod-
eling. Oxford University Press.
Lepinski, M., S. Micali, C. Peikert, and A. Shelat (2004).
Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk.
In Proc. 23rd ACM Symposium on Principles of Dis-
tributed Computing, pp. 1–10.
Li, J. (2006a). Information structures with unawareness.
Unpublished manuscript.
Li, J. (2006b). Modeling unawareness without impossible
states. Unpublished manuscript.
Lysyanskaya, A. and N. Triandopoulos (2006). Rational-
ity and adveresarial behavior in multi-party comptua-
tion. In CRYPTO 2006, pp. 180–197.
Micali, S. and R. Pass (2006). Local zero knowledge. In
Proc. 38th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pp. 306–315.
Modica, S. and A. Rustichini (1994). Awareness and
partitional information structures. Theory and Deci-
sion 37, 107–124.
Modica, S. and A. Rustichini (1999). Unawareness and
partitional information structures. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 27(2), 265–298.
Moreno, D. and J. Wooders (1996). Coalition-proof equi-
librium. Games and Economic Behavior 17(1), 80–
112.
Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games.
Proc. National Academy of Sciences 36, 48–49.
Neyman, A. (1985). Bounded complexity justifies coop-
eration in finitely repated prisoner’s dilemma. Eco-
nomic Letters 19, 227–229.
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A Course in
Game Theory. MIT Press.
Ozbay, E. (2007). Unawareness and strategic announce-
ments in games with uncertainty. In Theoretical As-
pects of Rationality and Knowledge: Proc. Eleventh
Conference (TARK 2007), pp. 231–238.
Papadimitriou, C. H. and M. Yannakakis (1994). On com-
plexity as bounded rationality. In Proc. 26th ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 726–733.
Pease, M., R. Shostak, and L. Lamport (1980). Reach-
ing agreement in the presence of faults. Journal of
the ACM 27(2), 228–234.
Rubinstein, A. (1986). Finite automata play the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 39,
83–96.
Shamir, A., R. L. Rivest, and L. Adelman (1981). Men-
tal poker. In D. A. Klarner (Ed.), The Mathematical
Gardner, pp. 37–43. Prindle, Weber, and Schmidt.
Urbano, A. and J. E. Vila (2002). Computational com-
plexity and communication: Coordination in two-
player games. Econometrica 70(5), 1893–1927.
Urbano, A. and J. E. Vila (2004). Computationally re-
stricted unmediated talk under incomplete informa-
tion. Economic Theory 23(2), 283–320.
Yao, A. (1982). Protocols for secure computation (ex-
tended abstract). In Proc. 23rd IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 160–164.
